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THE TAXATION OF PEDDLERS UNDER THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
CLAUSE.
The limitations imposed upon the taxing power of the states
by Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States,
are always subjects of interest to the student of constitutional
law. The Federal courts, since the decision in the great case
of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. x, have consistently held that the
power of Congress over interstate commerce was exclusive, and
in a number of notable decisions have defined broadly the
powers of the states in connection therewith. In Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, the Supreme Court enunciated the
original-package doctrine-that goods shipped into a state
could not be taxed as an import while remaining in the
original package, but could only be taxed after becoming mixed
with the mass of property in the state. The distinction between
the exercise of the police power of the states and the imposition
of taxes for revenue was pointed out most effectively in Minne-
sota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, for while a state might impose a
valid tax where such tax was in the reasonable exercise of the
police power (as for instance, the right to charge an inspection
fee at ports, or for the inspection of food stuffs), or might
prohibit wholly by virtue of that power the importation of goods
detrimental to the health and welfare of its citizens, it could not
exercise this power as a shield to exclude from its markets the
proper subjects of import from other states. Robbins v. Shelby
Taxing District, 120 U. S. 439, held that a license tax could not
be levied upon a drummer selling goods by sample in another
state, even though there was no discrimination in favor of
citizens of the state. Where Congress has imposed no restric-
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tion upon commerce it is the intention of the Federal Govern-
ment that it should remain free and unfettered. State Freight
Tax Cases, 15 Wall. 232, 279. All of these decisions proceed
upon the theory that the power to tax is the power to destroy,
and that for this reason no power can be conceded to the states,
else the very object for which the exclusive power was granted
to the Federal Government would be destroyed.
But between these great cases and the multitude of decisions
under them there is left a broad margin of debatable ground
wherein the rights of the states are not as yet clearly defined.
While the case of Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District exempted
from taxation one who goes into the state merely for the pur-
pose of taking orders, which afterward are shipped direct to the
purchaser by the principal in another state, a different question
arises when the goods are afterward shipped to the agent and
by him distributed to the purchaser. Are the goods and the
occupation of the person distributing them the subject of
taxation? This question has not as yet, we believe, been
squarely before the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the
state courts are by no means uniform.
The latest of these is the decision in the case of Wrought Iron
Range Co. v. Campen, j7 S. E. 658, in the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. In that state the Revenue Act of 1903 levied a license
tax upon peddlers doing business in the state. The defendant
sold its goods by means of a sample range carried by its agents,
the orders being filled by the shipment into the state of the
ranges in separate crates consigned to the warehouse of the
defendant, and from there distributed by another agent to the
purchaser. A second clause of the revenue act defined the
term "peddler" to include "any person carrying a wagon, cart
or buggy, or travelling on foot for the purpose of exhibiting or
delivering any wares or merchandise." The decision cited
held this act to be in conflict with the Constitution of the
United States, and to be void and of no effect, thus reversing a
line of decisions upholding legislation practically similar.
The first of these cases arose in 1896, under a similar statute
imposing a license tax upon agents, in the case of Range Co. v.
Carver, i18 N. C. 335. The statute was there upheld upon the
theory that the defendant, being a foreign corporation, could
only do business in the state by comity, and that it could not
claim greater privileges than the state gave to its own citizens.
The principle was again called in question in 19oo in the case
of Statev. Caldwel, 127 N. C. 521, where the defendant took
orders for pictures which were shipped to him knocked down,
and then put together by him and delivered to the customer.
This the court held not to be a delivery in the original package
within Brown v. Maryland, or within Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S.
296. In Collier v. Burgin, 13o N. C. 632, the subject was again
considered and the former decisions affirmed. In that case the
agent took orders for books by sample, and afterward delivered
the books in unbroken sets, as they were shipped to him.
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The ground of decision was, however, slightly different. "The
books," said the court, "are shipped in New York by the
plaintiff to the plaintiff in North Carolina. There is no com-
merce about it. When the plaintiff gets his goods here, if he
wishes to peddle them he must do like other people who have
goods and wish to peddle them. He must submit to the laws of
the state and obtain a license."
The present case repudiates all these grounds of validity as
contradictory to the doctrines of the Supreme Court, and in a
lengthy opinion the court reviews the entire law upon the sub-
ject. The decision is based upon the fact that the goods are
shipped into the state in unbroken packages, and in this form
delivered to the purchaser. The court says: "When we once
concede, as we must, that the power of Congress to regulate
commerce among the several states does not stop at the
boundary of a state, but must enter its interior and operate
there, and that, being 'coextensive with the subject on which
it acts' its full force is not spent until there is a sale of the arti-
cle which is imported, and not then if there is any discriminaton
against the goods because of their foreign character, the con-
clusion we have reached seems to be inevitable. . . . The
mere calling the plaintiff a peddler does not make it a peddler,
for the purpose of laying a tax upon its business as an importer
which interferes with interstate commerce, and is in its essence
a regulation of the same."
In the neighboring state of Georgia a similar statute came to
the attention of its supreme court in Wrought Iron Range
Co. v. Johnson, 84 Ga. 754, and the court held that the agent
who solicited such orders only, and who did not afterwards
deliver them, could not be made subject to such a tax on ped-
dlers. But in a later decision, Raine Iron Co. v. McCommons,
iii Ga. 538, this case is limited to that state of facts alone, and
held not to include the receiving or distributing agent who
afterward receives them, nor the goods themselves when so
received. The decision assumes that there is no reason why
such goods should not be deemed part of the mass of the
property in the state as soon as they are received by the agent,
regardless of the fact that there is some purchaser willing to
take them from him in the performance of a purely executory
contract. Cases which coincide with this view of the Georgia
court are Newcastle v. Cutler, 15 Pa. Super. Ct. 612, and In re
Wilson, i 9 D. C. 341.
RAILROADS: LIABILITY OF LESSOR FOR INJURIES TO LESSEE'S
SERVANT ARISING THROUGH NEGLIGENCE OF LESSEE.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in a recent decision (Ry. Co.
v. Hart, 7o N. E. 654), announced a general rule making a
lessor railroad company liable to an employee of a lessee rail-
road company for a tort arising solely through the lessee's neg-
ligence. It is difficult to see how such a conclusion could have
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been reached in the absence of a statutory enactment making
lessor companies liable in such cases unless expressly absolved
from liability. The reasoning of the learned court, in handing
down the decision, is not so convincing as that in the dissenting
opinion. Proceeding upon the assumption that the employee
of a railroad company stands in the same relation to the rail-
road company as does the general public, it attempts to fix the
lessor's liability partly upon the old maxims, "Qui facit per
alium facit per se "and "Respondeat superior"; and partly
upon principles of public policy.
It is conceded that the lessor company would be liable for a
tort committed by the lessee company upon a stranger, and
also for a tort committed upon an employee of a lessee under
circumstances where the responsibility might rest fairly upon
the lessor, as for example, where the tortious injury was the
result of a defect in the road-bed. But neither of these points
is involved in the Illinois case. The only question in that case
is as to the liability of the lessor to an employee of the lessee
for an injury arising solely through the lessee's negligence.
It must be borne in mind that each state has its own regula-
tions with regard to the liability in such cases. Notwithstand-
ing this, there is remarkable unanimity of opinion amongst the
authorities, as seen in the adjudicated cases, to the effect that
liability for torts upon servants of lessee companies, arising
solely from the negligence of the lessee, attaches to the lessee
and not to the lessor. This has been held not only in states
where legislative authority to lease has been given, Swice v.
Hkand B. S. R. Co., Ct. of App., Ky., June 30, 1903; V. H1 R.
Co. v. Washington, 86 Va. 629; Banks v. Ga. R. & B Co., 112 Ga.
655; Zee v. S. P. R. R. Co., 1i6 Calif. 97, but also in one state
at least where such authority was not given, B. & 0. and C. R.
Co. v. Paul, 140 Ind. 23. The only case which can be found
directly upon the point and holding to the contrary is Logan v.
N. C. R. R. Co., ix6 N. C. 940. This case was referred to in
the decision of the Illinois Court, but it must be remembered
that in North Carolina there is a positive legislative enactment
providing that liability shall attach to the lessor company in
cases of injuries to the employees of a lessee company, unless
the lessor company is expressly absolved from liability. The
law as held in the majority of the cases cited may be found in
2 Ell. R. R., 61o; i Wood Rys., 25; Pall. Ry. Ac. Law, §§ 130-131.
In 23 Am. and Eang. Enc. of Law 785, after setting forth the rule
in Illinois with respect to the liability of the lessor company to
the general public, it is said: "The rule of liability which has
just been stated does not apply to the lessee's servants who may
be injured through the lessee's regligence."
An employee of a railroad company and a stranger do not
stand in the same relation to the railroad company. The dis-
tinction between the two is drawn clearly in B. and 0. & C. R.
Co. v. Paul, 143 Ind. 23. The lessor by accepting its charter
assumes the obligation of carrying passengers safely on its line.
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If it intrusts that duty to another company, and a passenger
is injured, it is liable. It assumes also to operate its road with
such degree of skill and care that the lives of those who have
the right to pass on or near its tracks will not be jeopardized.
Should the lessee inflict injuries upon wayfarers who cross its
road, the lessor is liable. But the duty which a railroad com-
pany owes to its servant does not arise from the fact that the
servant is one of the general public, but from the contract of
service. If, therefore, the servant of a lessee is injured he
must look to the lessee for redress and not to the lessor, who
can be held liable in such a case upon no principle of justice.
When recovery has been allowed against the lessor upon
grounds of public policy, it has been under circumstances
wholly different from those in the Illinois case. As indicated in
the dissenting opinion, it has been because public policy demands
that so far as the general public is concerned, a corporation
should be held responsible for the proper exercise of the powers
granted; or, because the corporation would be enabled to place
the operation of its road in the hands of irresponsible parties,
were their liability denied; or, because an injured party might
be seriously hindered in obtaining his redress through ignor-
ance as to what corporation to sue. The dissenting opinion
shows clearly that none of these reasons apply to the servant of
a lessee company. The servant needs no protection as one of
the general public because he can enter the service or not as he
chooses. He is not required to enter the service of an irre-
sponsible company. If he is injured he certainly knows which
company to sue.
It is noteworthy that three justices concur in the dissenting
opinion, one of marked learning and ability, and apparently
much more in line with the trend of decision on the subject of
the liability of lessor railroad companies than that of the
majority.
QUO WARRANTO: THE EXTENT OF THE JURISDICTION OF AN APPEL-
LATE COURT TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION.
In a recent opinion, in the case of State ex. rel. Ellis, Atty.
General v. Board of Deputy State Supervisors of Cuyahoga County,
handed down by the Supreme Court of Ohio, a very interesting
question arose, which may be stated as follows: Can a Court
having appellate jurisdiction only, except tor quo warranto,
mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus, for which it has
original jurisdiction, while hearing quo warranto proceedings,
issue an injunction against one of the parties to the proceeding?
The facts as found in the Ohio case were these: On April 23,
1904. a new law went into effect changing the method of appoint-
ing judges of election. The effect of the law was to abolish the
old board and establish a new one. The old board questioned
the constitutionality of the new law and refused to give up the
office. Proceedings in quo warranto were instituted to try the
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title to the office. Pending the decision upon the merits of the
case an election was to be held. The point in the above proposi-
tion was raised by the attorney general on motion for an injunc-
tion compelling the old board to deliver to the new board the
ballot boxes and other property of the office.
From an examination of the authorities one would seem
justified in laying down the following general propositions as
well established: First, that an information in the nature of
quo warranto is the proper remedy to try the title to office,
when such title is in question. Second, that quo warranto is the
proper remedy to test the constitutionality of the law under
which an officer is elected. Hinze v. People, 92 Ill. 406; People v.
Ruordan, 73 Mich. 508.
The case under discussion is a little outside of the applica-
tion of either of the above rules. It raises the question of title
to office and of the constitutionality of the law under which that
title is claimed, but both questions in this case grow out of the
question whether one office has been abolished and another
created. In State, Worthey, Prosecutor, v. Steen, Mayor, 43 N. J.
L. 542, the rule is laid down that where an office has been
abolished, the proper remedy to compel one claiming to exercise
the office by virtue of a previous right to desist from such
exercise, is by quo warranto. It would appear from the above
propositions that there could be no question as to the correct-
ness of the proceeding until a motion for an injunction was
introduced. The decision on the motion in the Ohio court
turned entirely upon the interpretation of sections 5572 ind 5573
of the Revised Statutes of Ohio. Yeoman v. Lesley, 36 Ohio St.
416, bears out the decision in this case, that the court under
Sections S572-73 has jurisdiction to issue the injunction. So,
also, does Wagner v. Railway Co., 38 Ohio 32. But what of the
jurisdiction of a court which is not supported by statute, to
issue the injunction? Kent v. ZMohoffy, 2 Ohio St. 498, which
was decided before the above statutes were enacted, states in
the opinion, though the question was not directly before the
court, that the court did not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction. In Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne and Chicago Ry. Co. v. Hurd
& Fair, 17 Ohio St. 144, where the Supreme Court was asked to
dissolve an injunction, the rule was laid down that it had no
power to dissolve nor to grant an injunction. The trend of the
Ohio decisions would seem to be against the right of issuing an
injunction unless that power was expressly granted.
Let us compare this right, by way of analogy, with the right
of a supreme appellate court to exercise supervisory jurisdiction
over inferior courts where such right is not expressly granted.
Supervisory power does exist in the highest court of the state,
although that court may be restricted by organic and statute
law to appellate jurisdiction only, where it is clothed by the same
law with the power to issue the writs by means of which the power
of "superintendency" is exercised. This proposition is sup-
ported by many authorities. Hyatt v. Allen, 54 Cal. 353. For
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further authorities see 5z L. R. A. 36, note and cases cited,
from which we may also draw the conclusion that when clothed
by constitution or statute neither with power of superintending
control nor with authority to issue the several writs by means
of which that power is usually exerted, the supreme appellate
court will not assume to exercise it.
But the above proposition is qualified by the following:
That courts of purely appellate jurisdiction will isstie to the
court over which that jurisdiction extends any of the writs, and
exercise all the control, essential to compel the subordinate court
to act. Exparte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 634; see 51 L. R. A- iio f.
From the above propositions, we may draw the conclusion
that a court of appellate jurisdiction, though clothed with no
supervisory power, will imply that power when it is essential to
the carrying out of its appellate jurisdiction. If a court will
imply the power to issue the writs of prohibition, certiorari or
mandamus, as the case may require, to aid its appellate jurisdic-
tion, why should it not have the same implied power to issue an
injunction in aid of its original jurisdiction when that jurisdic-
tion is explessly granted?
In the absence of any direct adjudication it would seem that
the logical conclusion would be that an injunction would issue
when it was necessary to preserve intact the subject matter of
the litigation, pending the rendition of the decision, though it
be a court of appellate jurisdiction only, and one having no
express power to issue the writ.
